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REPELLENT CRIMES AND RATIONAL DELIBERATION:
EMOTION AND THE DEATH PENALTY
Susan A. Bandes "
ABSTRACT
It is often assumed that the anger, outrage, and other strong emotions
provoked by repellent crimes interfere with rational deliberation. There is
some truth to the notion that heinous murders and other shocking crimes
place an enormous strain on the criminal justice system and may exert a
destructive influence on institutional process. Nevertheless, the argument
that strong emotion interferes with rational deliberation begs the question:
What is rational deliberation? In this article, I argue for an understanding of
rational deliberation that recognizes its pervasive emotional content. I
suggest that the legal system operates on certain misconceptions about
emotion that are harmful to institutional process. The most pervasive
misconception is that the very attempt to address emotion is destabilizing to
the rule of law. Though the legal system rarely incorporates scientific or
social-scientific knowledge of emotional dynamics, it nevertheless operates
on its own assumptions about how emotions work. It tends to take three
approaches to emotion: requiring it to be "set aside" (e.g., the antisympathy
instruction), permitting it to be "introduced" (e.g., the victim impact
statement), and ignoring it (e.g., the refusal to clarify the meaning of life
without parole despite evidence that juries misunderstand the term).
I argue that the legal approach to emotion and rationality is based on
three primary misconceptions about the nature of emotion: 1) that emotions
are tangible objects with an identity independent of the person they are in or
the institutional context in which they occur; 2) that emotions are private
and internal feelings rather than processes that take shape in a social world;
and 3) that emotions are bursts of uncontrollable passion that short-circuit
rational deliberation. Using the example of capital punishment, I illustrate
that these misconceptions have serious consequences for the structure and
operation of the capital system.
* Distinguished Research Professor, DePaul University College of Law; Visiting Professor,
University of Chicago Law School, 2007-2008.
t I owe special thanks to Carol Sanger for inviting me to deliver the Barbara Black Spring
Lecture on Women and the Law at Columbia Law School for which this article was originally written. I
am also indebted to Scott Sundby and to the participants in the University of California, Berkeley Center
for Law and Policy bag-lunch series, the New York University Law and Culture Colloquium and the
Criminal Justice Forum at Cleveland-Marshall College of Law for insightful comments on earlier drafts,
and to Kayleigh Van Poolen for excellent research assistance.
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INTRODUCTION
Is there something about repellent crimes, such as heinous and
brutal murders, that places a particular strain on the legal system? Scott
Turow, who has both prosecuted and defended capital cases, observed that
"it is ... extreme and repellent crimes that provoke the highest emotions-
anger, especially, even outrage-that in turn make rational deliberation
problematic for investigators, prosecutors, judges, and juries."''
Scott Peterson was accused of killing his lovely young pregnant wife
while he was having an affair;2 Susan Smith of drowning her two toddlers
in her car after strapping them into their car seats; 3 John Lee Malvo of
shooting randomly picked strangers in a series of murders that terrorized the
Washington, D.C. area;4 and Karla Faye Tucker of killing Deborah
Thornton with a pickaxe because she happened to be in the room.5 These
cases evoked intense community-wide emotions including fear, anger, and
grief, as well as a general sense of a rupture in the social fabric. The crimes
sparked a media frenzy that heightened the emotional intensity and spread it
well beyond the immediate locale. Not every heinous murder garners
national attention, but death-eligible murders tend to be horrifying enough
to rivet the attention of the local community. The community shares in the
horror of the crime, the fear while the perpetrator is at large, the agony of
the victims' family and friends, the outrage at the accused, and the desire to
see justice done-and swiftly. Yet somehow the legal system, charged with
deciding the fate of the accused, is expected to float free of this emotional
intensity-an island of pure deliberative reason.
Brutal and shocking crimes exert enormous pressure on the criminal
justice system. There is evidence that, despite the layers of process for which
the capital system is well known, the investigation and prosecution of such
crimes exerts a destructive influence on institutional process.6 It is not just the
jury that may allow revulsion to overwhelm judgment; every legal institution
charged with implementing the death penalty wrestles with the passions such
1. SCOTT TUROW, ULTIMATE PUNISHMENT: A LAWYER'S REFLECTIONS ON DEALING WITH
THE DEATH PENALTY 34 (2003).
2. Nick Madigan, California Man Arrested in Death of Wife, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2003, at A8.
3. Woman Held in Drowning of Two Sons is Arraigned, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1995, at A10,
available at 1995 WLNR 3784856.
4. Lynette Clemetson, Retracing a Trail: A Troubled Youth; For Teenager, Troubling Bond in
Chaotic Life, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2002, § 1, at 1, available at 2002 WLNR 3543739.
5. Sue Anne Pressley, Pro-Death Penalty but Chivalrous Texans Debate Fate of Karla Faye
Tucker, WASH. POST, Jan. 25, 1998, at A3.
6. See generally JAMES S. LIEBMAN ET AL., A BROKEN SYSTEM: ERROR RATES IN CAPITAL
CASES, 1973-1995, pts. I & II (June 12, 2000), http://www2.law.columbia.edu/instructionalservices/
liebman/liebman fmnal.pdf (finding error of "epidemic proportions" throughout the capital system).
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crimes evoke. My focus is, in part, on the emotional dynamics that contribute
to these extraordinary strains on the capital system.
However, I have broader ambitions for the article as well. The legal
system's treatment of capital crimes provides a window into a larger
discussion about the intersection of emotion and legal process. Capital
punishment is both the best and worst starting point for such a discussion. It
provides fertile terrain for discussing emotion in part because its emotional
content is so salient7 and so obviously difficult to excise from the decision-
making process. Strong emotions are expressed in the courtroom and the
jury room; words like "mercy," "sympathy," and "vengeance" even creep
into the official discourse. But the focus on the death penalty also lays a
trap for those interested in the broader questions of emotion's role-the
problem of death penalty exceptionalism. Capital punishment is depicted as
an exceptional challenge to the system, implicitly positing a criminal justice
system that is capable of acting rationally, but that is sorely tested, and
sometimes overwhelmed, by the passions evoked in death penalty cases.
But this formulation is misleading. It begs the antecedent question: What
does rational deliberation consist of?
To focus solely on the intense passions elicited in death penalty cases
is to mistake the pervasive and often invisible influence of emotion on
every aspect of the decision-making process. The challenges that capital
punishment poses for the criminal justice system, or for the rule of law
generally, are not unique. Even in the capital context, the focus on salient
emotions is dangerously misleading. This article discusses our system of
capital punishment both as an institution in which emotional salience poses
special challenges and as a pathway to the larger questions of emotion's
role in the law.
I. THE LAW'S ATTITUDE TOWARD EMOTION:
COULD WE PLEASE NOT TALK ABOUT THIS?
Decision-making in capital cases calls upon a complex blend of explicit
rules, appeals to moral intuition, and abstract principles (like "cruel and
unusual punishment" or "evolving standards of decency") that implicate a
variety of cognitive, moral, and emotional processes. What is the
institutional role in ensuring that this complex blend of rules and principles
is designed to promote good decision-making? In other words, to what
7. Salience is a term in technical use in psychology, neuroscience, semiotics, and other
disciplines. Although there are variations in meaning across and even within these disciplines, the term
generally refers to the accessibility, intensity, or attention-getting properties of an event or other entity.
Shih-Chen Yen & Leif H. Finkel, Salience, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE HuMAN BRAIN 237, 237 (2002).
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extent should the criminal justice system incorporate knowledge of how
decisions are in fact made? This question is a familiar one. The legal system
is continually confronted with rapidly evolving scientific and social-
scientific knowledge, and with difficult questions about how to evaluate and
respond to it. For example, how should law incorporate evolving scientific
knowledge about climate change or lie-detection techniques? Or evolving
social-scientific knowledge about comprehension of jury instructions or the
psychological effects of spousal abuse? However, legal professionals
generally do not view information about emotion the way they view other
interdisciplinary knowledge. Instead of worrying about what the legal
system ought to do with new information about emotional dynamics, they
worry about whether it is advisable to start down this path of inquiry at all.
Questions about the role of emotion meet with somewhat less
resistance when they are couched in other terms. The debate about
morality's role in law continues unresolved, but its status as a proper
subject of debate is unquestioned.8 It is acceptable to talk about human
behavior, judgment, and cognitive bias. And it has become much easier to
talk about emotion itself now that cognitive neuroscience has begun to
study it. Brain imaging has given the fuzzy concept of emotion a
comforting materiality. As Jerome Kagan observes, "[t]he ability to
visualize an abstract idea has extraordinary power to persuade us of the
reality of the idea."9 Cognitive neuroscience has taken a study that has long
been deemed "scientifically unpursuable"' and made it respectable. It has
also provided a scientific language that allows fear to be approached with
reference to the amygdala, empathy with respect to mirror neurons, and
trust in relation to oxytocin. 1
But to talk about the emotions of fear, anger, disgust, sympathy, or
compassion, and especially to discuss the use of emotion by legal
professionals as opposed to lay actors-for example, judges instead of
juries-is a type of discourse that sounds strange to our ears. There is a
sense in which the very discussion of it is viewed as destabilizing. Indeed,
the term "emotion" when used in legal discourse has traditionally
8. See, e.g., Susan Bandes, What's Love Got To Do With t?, 8 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L.
97, 104-05 (2001) (discussing the acceptability in philosophical discourse of the language of values like
"autonomy" but not of values like "love"); Symposium, The Hart-Fuller Debate at Fifty, 83 N.Y.U. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2009) (conference announcement available at http://www.law.nyu.edu/
conferences/hartfuller/index.htm) (revisiting the famous debate on law and morality between H.L.A.
Hart and Lon Fuller).
9. JEROME KAGAN, WHAT IS EMOTION?: HISTORY, MEASURES AND MEANINGS 26 (2007).
10. Jaak Panksepp, At the Interface of the Affective, Behavioral, and Cognitive Neurosciences:
Decoding the Emotional Feelings of the Brain, 52 BRAIN & COGNITION 4, 5 (2003).
11. Id.
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functioned as a category of exclusion. To label an influence "emotional"
is to say it is inappropriate-the very opposite of the reasoned discourse
on which the legal system is premised. The traditional approach is to
define those influences regarded as improper as irrational and thus
emotional, and to treat influences that undeniably pervade the legal
system as really not about emotion at all-to talk instead about discretion,
politics, advocacy, interpretive leeway, nullification, decisional frame-
works, or even morality.
Recently a death penalty verdict was overturned because the jurors
consulted the Bible during deliberations.' 2 Specifically, the jury was
consulting Leviticus and its call for "[an] eye for [an] eye; [a] tooth for [a]
tooth.' 3 The Colorado Supreme Court said that "[j]urors must deliberate
• .. without the aid or distraction of extraneous texts."'14 Perhaps the court
meant that jurors cannot bring their own materials into the jury room-such
as Bibles, Black's Law Dictionaries, Ouija boards, 5 or, despite Henry
Fonda's famous scene in Twelve Angry Men, their own versions of the
murder weapon. On the other hand, perhaps the court meant that biblical
sources are distracting and extraneous, and that jurors should stick to
applying the law.
The question of what counts as "extraneous" to a legal decision is
complicated. When asked to determine what sort of punishment heinous
murderers deserve, people consult their moral, ethical, and religious beliefs.
They consult their emotional reactions-their empathy, disgust, and moral
outrage. They consult their understanding of how the world works by
relying on assumptions about why people behave as they do, about the
relevance of background and upbringing, about who is redeemable and who
deserves mercy, and about what ought to happen to those whose behavior
transgresses moral boundaries.
These diverse influences on judgment lead to the questions at the heart
of this article. Which influences on judgment should be considered
distracting or extraneous? Is the emotion that imbues capital decision-
making illegitimate? Can it be disentangled from moral, ethical, and
12. Kirk Johnson, Colorado Court Bars Execution Because Jurors Consulted Bible, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 29,2005, at Al, available at 2005 WLNR 4864980.
13. Id.
14. Id. There is a split in the circuits on this issue. See Warren Richey, Supreme Court Lets
Stand Death Sentence After Bible Reading, CHRISTIAN SCL MONITOR, Oct. 7, 2008, at 25, available at
2008 WLNR 19010373 (noting that the First, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits have prohibited introducing a
Bible into jury deliberations, whereas the Fourth and Ninth Circuits have permitted the reading of Bible
verses during deliberations).
15. J.D. SUNWOLF, PRACTICAL JURY DYNAMICS 8 (2004) (discussing a case in which four
jurors used a Ouija board to consult with the deceased victim during deliberations).
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religious influences on judgment? In the conventional story, moral, ethical,
and even some religious beliefs play a role in legal decision-making,
however ill-defined. Emotion is regarded quite differently. This difference
in treatment has much to do with how various influences are categorized.
For example, despite.the Colorado court's prohibition on bringing a Bible
into the jury room, courts rarely object to prosecutors who exhort juries to
abide by the "eye for an eye" injunction by returning a verdict of death.16
These references are rarely regarded as biblical, but are instead treated as
proper arguments for retribution or for appropriate punishment. Conversely,
defense appeals to exercise sympathy, mercy, or forgiveness toward the
defendant tend to be classified as appeals to emotion. In other words, they
are regarded as exhortations to the jury to turn away from fact and law and
give in to influences that are irrational and illegitimate.
The problem with this asymmetry is not that the law abhors emotional
responses. Nor is the problem that some emotional reactions take
precedence over others-that is inevitable in an adversarial proceeding. The
problem is the use of the category "emotional" to dismiss disfavored
attitudes without analysis. The label "emotional" acts as a way of cutting
off discussion and insulating or marginalizing certain attitudes and
influences from scrutiny. For this reason, we need to pay close attention to
what gets labeled emotional. We need to pay particular attention to
assumptions about human behavior that go unchallenged or that "go
without saying., 17 We need a broader and more nuanced account of what
"emotional" and "rational" mean. Only then can we debate which emotions
advance the appropriate goals of the system, and investigate how to
channel, educate, or discourage those that do not.
These rather lofty and abstract issues about the role of emotion are
easier to think about in concrete legal contexts-appropriately so, since we
are talking not about philosophy or psychology for their own sake, but
about how to construct and conduct a legal system that has concrete and
quite serious consequences. This article focuses on the capital context,
which presents a conundrum. At first blush, the capital system seems a poor
vehicle for a discussion of the law's failure to grapple with emotional
influences. Emotion in capital trials is salient. It even receives some official
16. See Martin H. Pritikin, Punishment, Prisons, and the Bible: Does "Old Testament Justice"
Justify Our Retributive Culture?, 28 CARDOZO L. REv. 715, 727 n.87 (2006) (discussing various cases
from southern states that found the prosecutors' use of the phrase "eye for an eye" in closing statements
did not constitute plain error).
17. For an excellent discussion of the assumptions about emotion that "go without saying," see
Terry Maroney, Emotional Common Sense as Constitutional Law, 62 VAND. L. REv. (forthcoming
2009), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstract-id=1282368.
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recognition, as with appeals to mercy and the antisympathy instruction
discussed below. Some of the emotion in the capital punishment context is
obvious-but only some of it. Much of it is invisible-not categorized as
emotional. On closer inspection, the capital system is a good illustration of
what happens when we decide not to start down the path of inquiry into
emotional influences-or when we assume such influences are easily
cabined or addressed without any guidance from those disciplines that have
studied emotional dynamics.
The capital system is built upon choices among competing emotional
claims-some acknowledged and others not. Sometimes the system
attempts to regulate or bar emotion explicitly. Sometimes it simply ignores
emotion, regulating conduct as if no emotional variables were at play. And
sometimes it actively tries to introduce emotion. This article illustrates each
of these approaches. It argues that they reflect common and deeply
entrenched misapprehensions about how law and emotion intersect and that
these misapprehensions have serious consequences for the conduct of the
capital system.
A. Putting Emotion Aside: The Antisympathy Instruction
First, consider one of the few situations in which the possibility of
emotional influence is expressly acknowledged and made subject to
regulation: the antisympathy instruction, which informs the jury that it
"must not be swayed by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion,
prejudice, public opinion or public feeling."''8
In capital cases, the jury at the penalty phase is faced with the task of
rendering what is called a "reasoned moral decision" about whether the
defendant should be executed.' 9 Jurors must determine the worth of the
defendant's life, weigh it against the gravity and harm of the crime, and
determine whether the defendant deserves death. What does this mean in
practice? How does one determine what is moral in this context and,
moreover, whether one's moral response is reasoned? Jurors are given little
guidance on these daunting questions. Jurors receiving the antisympathy
instruction are told, essentially, that a decision influenced by sympathy,
passion, or sentiment is not a reasoned moral decision. Justice O'Connor, in
her concurrence in California v. Brown, explained that the instruction
properly recognized the jury's decision as a moral inquiry into the
culpability of the defendant and not an emotional response to the mitigating
18. California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 539 (1986).
19. See id. at 545 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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evidence.2° Consider the problems with this approach. Jurors are not given
any guidance on what the term "sympathy" means. To complicate matters
further, jurors are permitted to exercise mercy, but they are not given a
definition of that term either. Moreover, they are given no instruction about
the other strong emotions they are likely to experience in the wake of a
capital trial and sentencing hearing. The implication seems to be either that
jurors can give appropriate effect to their anger, outrage, empathy, and grief
without any help, or that these reactions are not passions or sentiments, but
simply reasoned moral responses.
Current research on moral decision-making muddies this picture even
further. It is increasingly clear that emotion is an essential source of
information about-and an essential influence on-social and moral
judgment. 21 Antonio Damasio and other researchers have observed that
subjects with impaired access to their emotions may lose the ability to make
decisions beneficial to their well-being or the welfare of others.2 2 Access to
our emotions-our fear, compassion, remorse, and ability to empathize-
enables us to perceive and attend to the emotions of others, evaluate the
motives of others, and predict the consequences of our actions for others.23
It also motivates us to care about these consequences. Some of Damasio's
patients had intact reasoning skills but could no longer feel emotion.24 Like
psychopaths, they understood the consequences of their actions but had lost
the ability to care about the suffering of others.25 The instruction to jurors to
separate their moral instincts from their emotions when deciding whether
the defendant should be sentenced to death is based on outmoded
assumptions about moral reasoning.
How might these distinctions between reason, morality, and emotion
play out in an actual jury room? In Scott Sundby's fine book, A Life and
Death Decision, in which he draws on interviews with the members of
several capital juries after they render their verdicts, he tells the affecting
story of Peggy, the sole holdout against a capital sentence on a twelve
20. Id.
21. See Jonathan Haidt, The Moral Emotions, in HANDBOOK OF AFFECTIVE SCtENCEs 852,
852-70 (Richard J. Davidson et al. eds., 2003) (discussing the increasing number of studies regarding
moral emotions and claiming that "emotions are in fact in charge of the temple of morality").
22. ANTONIO DAMASIO, DESCARTES' ERROR: EMOTION, REASON, AND THE HUMAN BRAIN 34-
51 (1994) (discussing Elliot, a patient with damage to his prefrontal cortex). As Damasio points out, the
particular pathology will depend on the nature of the neurological damage at issue. Id at 38.
23. See, e.g., William D. Casebeer, Moral Cognition and Its Neural Constituents, 4 NATURE
REV. NEUROSCIENCE 841, 843-44 (2003) (discussing theory of mind as an essential component of
moral reasoning).
24. Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach
to Moral Judgment, 108 PSYCHOL. REV. 814, 824 (2001) (discussing experiments by Damasio).
25. Id.
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person jury.2 6 Peggy listened to the evidence of the defendant's childhood
and gained a glimmer of understanding about how he got caught up in a
cycle of violence.27 She thought she saw pain and confusion in his
demeanor, and this led her to see him as capable of redemption.28 She
heard evidence of how his younger brother died during an incident in
which the two were experimenting with alcohol and how he forever after
felt responsible for his brother's death and its effect on his family.29 This
testimony moved her because she had both a sister and a daughter.30 How
should we describe her process here? Is it empathy, sympathy, a merciful
attitude? Her outlook was, in some respects, affected by her religious
beliefs as well.31 She tended to believe people are redeemable and to
separate the sinner from the sin.32 How are we to separate the legal, moral,
religious, and emotional aspects of her deliberative process? How are we
to separate her deliberative process from her preexisting assumptions
about how people behave and how the world works? If her approach was
inappropriately emotional,, then how is a juror meant to give effect to
mitigation evidence and weigh it against the facts of the crime?
The antisympathy instruction is problematic for what it says, but also
for what it does not say. The singling out of sympathy for mention in the
instructions sends an implicit message that any other influences do not
count as emotional. This implication is often made quite explicit. For
example, in Saffle v. Parks, in which the jury had received an antisympathy
instruction, the prosecutor said in closing argument:
[Y]ou're not yourself putting Robyn Parks to death. You just
have become a part of the criminal justice system that says
when anyone does this, that he must suffer death. So all you are
doing is you're just following the law ... . [I]t's not on your
conscience. ... God's law is the very same. ... So don't let it
bother your conscience, you know.
3 3
26. Scorr E. SUNDBY, A LIFE AND DEATH DECISION: A JURY WEIGHS THE DEATH PENALTY
59-103 (2005).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 62.
29. Id. at 71.
30. Id. at 85-86.
31. Id. at 70.
32. Id.
33. Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 512 n.13 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (first alteration and
emphasis added in Safile).
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This misstatement of the law (which did not mandate a death sentence) 34 is,
of course, an evocation of the lex talionis: the law of "an eye for an eye."
Yet it barely registers as a discussion about vengeance or retribution, or
about religion or morality. It is treated like a garden-variety argument about
the law.
And this selective coding is just what Sundby describes in his account
of Peggy, the holdout juror-the other jurors regarded her as too weak-
minded, emotional, and irrational to do the job with which she was
entrusted.35 They thought she was violating her oath to vote for death where
warranted.36 They told her to "get [her] feelings off the defendant and onto
the victim-be sensible, be realistic.
37
Another juror's son was in a car crash during the deliberations; he
survived but the juror then had a visceral sense of what it is like to lose
someone without saying goodbye.38 During deliberations, he often
referred back to this sense and linked it to the inability of the victim's
family to say goodbye to the victim before he was murdered.3 9 Yet this
juror's argument was not regarded as emotional-simply as making what
was at stake more concrete. The emotions that lead to a death sentence are
coded as tough-minded, evincing an ability to follow the law even when it
is difficult.
B. Showing Some Emotion: Victim Impact Statements
In some instances, the legal system may explicitly permit the
introduction of emotion, as it did in Payne v. Tennessee, which held that it
is permissible for the families of murder victims to describe the emotional
impact of the crime to the court and the jury at the penalty phase of a capital
trial.40 The Payne decision upheld the delivery of a heartbreaking
34. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.11 (West 2009) (effective July 24, 1976; amended
1987 in a manner not relevant here) (defining conditions under which a jury may impose the death
penalty, but omitting any circumstances under which the death penalty is required); see also Woodson
v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303 (1976) (striking down North Carolina's death penalty statute
because, inter alia, the mandatory sentencing procedure did not allow for "particularized consideration
of relevant aspects of the character and record of each convicted defendant before the imposition upon
him of a sentence of death").
35. SUNDBY, supra note 26, at 67.
36. Id. at 90-92.
37. Id. at 88.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825 (1981). The reasoning in Payne does not explicitly
acknowledge the emotional content of the statements. Rather, it depicts the statements as a vehicle for
providing additional information to the jury--specifically, a fuller understanding of the harm caused by
the crime. Id. For discussions of the emotions evoked by victim impact statements, see Susan Bandes,
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statement by the mother of a murder victim:
He cries for his mom. He doesn't seem to understand why she
doesn't come home. And he cries for his sister Lacie. He comes
to me many times during the week and asks me, Grandmama, do
you miss my Lacie. And I tell him yes. He says, I'm worried
about my Lacie.
41
Although this testimony is nearly unbearably painful to read, and must
have been devastating to hear in court, the Payne court saw such statements
as conveying information, not emotion.42 It described them as "simply
another form or method of informing the sentencing authority about the
specific harm caused by the crime in question. ' ' 3 What sort of information
are victim impact statements meant to convey? Victim impact testimony is
not meant to convey the fact of the murder-that is established in the guilt
phase. It conveys the emotional impact of losing the particular victim. The
Court in Payne expressed confidence that courts would bar unduly
inflammatory victim impact evidence whose prejudicial emotional effect
outweighed its informational value. 44 But the distinction between
prejudicial effect and informational value borders on the incoherent in this
context, given that the value of the information is its ability to evoke pain
and make grief salient.
The Supreme Court recently declined an opportunity to clarify this
distinction, denying certiorari in two cases involving victim impact
testimony in the form of two emotionally powerful films about the lives of
the victims. 45 One of these included music by Enya, a voiceover by the
victim's mother, and a concluding shot of wild horses running free
(depicting "the kind of heaven" in which the victim's mother said her
daughter belonged).46 The California Supreme Court held the videos
admissible, finding that they "expressed no outrage," and contained no
Empathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 361 (1996) [hereinafter Bandes,
Empathy]; Susan Bandes, Victims, "Closure, " and the Sociology of Emotion, in LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 11-15, on file with the Vermont Law Review) [hereinafter
Bandes, Victims].
41. Payne, 501 U.S. at 814-15 (quoting Mary Zvokanek, mother and grandmother of the victims).
42. Id. at 825.
43. Id.
44. Id at 831 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor opined that where the admission of
the evidence rendered the sentencing process fundamentally unfair, it might run afoul of the Due Process
Clause. Id.
45. People v. Kelly, 171 P.3d 548 (Cal. 2007), cert. denied, Kelly v. California, 129 S. Ct. 564,
564 (2008) (Stevens and Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
46. Kelly, 171 P.3d at 570.
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"clarion call for vengeance, ' 47 but "just implied sadness.4 8 Similarly, it
held that the video montage in the companion case was "not unduly
emotional."49 The California court betrayed a misunderstanding of the nature
of emotion-it searched for a salient emotional message, found none, and
thus overlooked the devastating emotional impact of the testimony. In his
dissent from the denial of certiorari, Justice Stevens quoted a federal district
court judge who said of his own exposure to victim impact testimony:
I cannot help but wonder if Payne ... would have been decided
in the same way if the Supreme Court Justices in the majority had
ever sat as trial judges in a federal death penalty case and had
observed first hand, rather than through review of a cold record,
the unsurpassed emotional power of victim impact testimony on a
jury. It has now been over four months since I heard this
testimony ... and the juror's sobbing during the victim impact
testimony still rings in my ears.50
Victim impact testimony is imbued with emotion, as this judge's
description attests. It also conveys information. As Justice Breyer
observed about the video montage in the California case, it did "remind
the jur[ors] that the person whose life was taken was a unique human
being," which gave them "'a quick glimpse of the life' the defendant
'chose to extinguish."' 5 It did this by evoking emotion in a way a cold
evidentiary record could not have accomplished. The questions are
whether the information conveyed was relevant, and whether its emotional
impact interfered with the jury's ability to deliberate on all the relevant
evidence. As Justice Stevens pointed out, "[n]o member of the
[California] court suggested that the evidence shed any light on the
character of the offense, the character of the offender, or the defendant's
moral culpability. ' 52 The sharp distinction between evidence that evokes
47. Id.at 571.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 570. In Zamudio v. California, the video montage contained 118 photographs of the
victims at various stages of their lives, including their childhood and early years of marriage, and
concluding with photographs of the victims' graves. Kelly v. California, 129 S. Ct. 564, 567 n.3 (2008)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing People v. Zamudio, 181 P.3d 105 (Cal. 2008)), denying cert. to Kelly,
171 P.3d at 548.
50. Kelly v. California, 129 S. Ct. 564, 567 n.3 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting United
States v. Johnson, 362 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1107 (N.D. Iowa 2005)), denying cert. to Kelly, 171 P.3d at
548 (first alteration in Kelly, 129 S. Ct. at 567 n.3).
51. Kelly v. California, 129 S. Ct. 567, 568 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Payne v.
Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 830, 831 (1991) (O'Connor, J., concurring)), denying cert. to People v.
Zamudio sub nom Kelly v. California, 181 P.3d 105 (Cal. 2008).
52. Kelly v. California, 129 S. Ct. 564, 565 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting), denying cert. to
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emotion and evidence that conveys information (i.e., that triggers
cognition) muddies the courts' analysis and leaves them with no
framework for determining whether this particular information, and these
particular emotions, belong in the courtroom.
In allowing victim impact testimony, the Court in Payne made an
assumption that seems, at first blush, both logical and fair. It assumed that
victim impact statements are required to make the suffering of victims and
their loved ones salient in the same way that the defendant's humanity is
salient. This argument has tremendous emotional power. Its emotional
resonance arises, in part, from the fact that grief about the victim's death,
empathy for those who loved the victim, and anger at the defendant, feel
natural and right. These feelings come easily, without any assistance from
the legal system. One error the Court made was in treating the victim
impact testimony in isolation rather than considering the emotional
landscape of the trial as a whole. There is evidence that capital jurors enter
the penalty phase with feelings of intense anger toward the defendant and
intense empathy toward the victim and the victim's family. It is all too
common for jurors to decide that the defendant should be executed before
the penalty phase even begins.53 Their difficulty at this juncture is not in
imagining the humanity and suffering of the victim and survivors, but in
meeting their constitutionally mandated duty to remain open to the
defendant's mitigation evidence before determining whether a death
sentence is appropriate.54 Jurors do need help keeping their anger and grief
from overwhelming their ability to hear the defendant's arguments. The
victim impact statement intensifies their anger and grief instead.
The admissibility of victim impact testimony is also premised on
certain assumptions about what murder survivors need in order to heal.55
In the years since Payne was decided, it has become an article of faith that
victim impact statements promote closure for murder survivors. But there
is no good evidence that this is true. Those who have lost loved ones to
murder tend to reject the notion of closure. Sharon Tewksbury, whose
husband was murdered, said the following after the man responsible for
the murder was executed: "My goal is to get all of the media to
understand that 'closure' is a bad word, a word survivors don't
Kelly, 171 P.3d at 548.
53. William J. Bowers, Maria Sandys & Benjamin D. Steiner, Foreclosed Impartiality in
Capital Sentencing: Jurors' Predispositions, Guilt-Trial Experience, and Premature Decision Making,
83 CORNELL L. REv. 1476, 1477 (1988). See also CRAIG HANEY, DEATH BY DESIGN: CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT AS A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL SYSTEM 174-75 (2005).
54. Bowers et al., supra note 53, at 1485-86.
55. Bandes, Victims, supra note 40 (manuscript at 11-15).
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understand. 5 6 Moreover, even if closure is possible, it does not follow
that it can or should take place during a capital trial.57 Emotions take
shape in the social world; they do not remain stable and fixed regardless
of institutional context.
C. Ignoring Emotion:
Fear, Jury Confusion, and the Meaning of Life Without Parole
Third, consider a situation in which emotions are not acknowledged,
and in which there is empirical evidence that the legal system is operating
on problematic assumptions about how emotions operate. Several studies
establish that there is a common perception-among jurors in actual capital
trials as well as among the citizenry at large-that life without parole means
about fifteen years in prison58 (or seven years in prison in Georgia).59
Studies have also shown that when jurors have the option of sentencing the
defendant to life without parole, and understand that it really means life
without parole, they will often choose that option instead of a death
sentence.6 ° In spite of this evidence, when jurors ask judges to explain the
meaning of life without parole, the common judicial protocol is to refuse to
answer, often instructing the jury that the terms should be given their "plain
and ordinary meanings.",61 The Supreme Court has held that the defendant
has no right to demand more accurate information unless his future
dangerousness is specifically at issue.62 It has found future dangerousness to
be at issue when the prosecution specifically cites it as a reason to impose a
death sentence.63 Yet the evidence suggests that, in capital trials, future
56. Rethinking "Closure," ARTICLE 3 (Murder Victims' Families for Human Rights,
Cambridge, Mass.), Fall 2008/Winter 2009, at 2.
57. In prior articles, I have addressed victim impact statements in far greater depth. See
Bandes, Empathy, supra note 40, at 364-65 (arguing that victim impact statements should be
inadmissible because of the emotions they evoke during sentencing); Bandes, Victims, supra note 40
(manuscript at 14) (examining the claim that victim impact statements promote closure).
58. See, e.g., Benjamin D. Steiner, William J. Bowers & Austin Sarat, Folk Knowledge as
Legal Action: Death Penalty Judgments and the Tenet of Early Release in a Culture of Mistrust and
Punitiveness,. 33 LAw & SOc'Y REv. 461, 472 (1999) (showing that citizens in New York, Nebraska,
Kansas, and Massachusetts believe that offenders convicted of first degree murder usually serve less
than fifteen years in prison before being paroled or released).
59. William J. Bowers & Benjamin D. Steiner, Death by Default: An Empirical Demonstration
of False and Forced Choices in Capital Sentencing, 77 TEx. L. REv. 608, 650-51 (1999).
60. Id. at 609 n. 10.
61. Kelly v. South Carolina, 534 U.S. 246, 257 (2002).
62. See John H. Blume, Stephen P. Garvey & Sheri Lynn Johnson, Future Dangerousness in
Capital Cases: Always "At Issue, " 86 CORNELL L. REV. 397, 398 (2001).
63. Kelly, 534 U.S. at 254. See also Shafer v. South Carolina, 532 U.S. 36, 51, 54-55 (2001).
In Shafer, the prosecutor introduced evidence of the defendant's past aggressive conduct but did not
explicitly argue future dangerousness. Id. The Court remanded for a decision on whether future
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dangerousness usually is at issue,64 and that it appears to exert a powerful
influence on jurors.65
II. ONCE MORE WITH FEELING: WHAT IS EMOTION?
There is a growing body of empirical evidence about the operation of
the death penalty, and particularly about the dynamics of the capital jury.
These studies demonstrate a marked disjunction between the role emotion
plays and the role the law acknowledges. The law's conception of this role
is grounded on several widely held misconceptions about what emotion is
and how it functions, which I will briefly describe.
A. The Fundamental Misconceptions
Misconception one: emotions are material objects. They have an
identity independent of the person they are in. As sociologist Arlie
Hochschild observes, we talk about "expressing," "storing," or "getting in
touch with" emotions.66 Anger "overtakes or overwhelms us."'67 Fear creeps
up on us.68 Love deserts US.69 These metaphors are more than just rhetorical
flourishes. They reflect and inform our understanding of how the world
works.7 ° We assume that objects have certain properties. If we think of
emotions as objects, we assume-often unconsciously-that they are
cohesive. We imagine them as having clear boundaries, as assuming the
same shape no matter where they are located, as capable of being moved
from place to place, or of retaining their essence over time.
This way of thinking plays a prominent role in legal regulation of
emotion. Most noticeably, the law approaches emotions as entities that it
can add or remove, and that retain their shape regardless of location. It
assumes it can inculcate shame through shaming penalties, and that shame
will have the same civilizing effect on each defendant.7' It assumes it can
dangerousness was at issue. Id. at 51, 55.
64. See generally Blume et al., supra note 62, at 398, 401 (presenting research indicating jurors
consider future dangerousness of offenders in most capital trials).
65. See Bowers & Steiner, supra note 59, at 664-71 (presenting evidence that jurors'
misunderstanding of the meaning of life without parole leads to more death sentences).





70. GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE By 3-6 (1980); GEORGE
LAKOFF, THE POLITICAL MIND 14-15 (2008).
71. See, e.g., Toni Massaro, Show (Some) Emotion, in THE PASSIONS OF LAW 80, 81 (Susan
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prohibit sympathy by instructing jurors to put it aside, but it does not tell
them how to extricate it or where they ought to put it.
Emotions are regarded as objects in another way-they are treated as
unchanging regardless of the social or cultural context in which they unfold.
Significant changes in the capital system have been based on assumptions
about what the families of murder victims need in order to heal or attain
closure. The notion of "healing" or "closure" on which these changes are
predicated tends to be static, taking no account of differences between the
needs of different murder survivors or changes in their emotions over
time." But the oddest aspect of this notion of closure is its acontextual
nature. The language of healing and therapy has been imported to the legal
arena with little thought about whether the capital system is capable of
serving therapeutic goals-or about what other values might be
compromised in the process.
Misconception two: emotions are private and internal.73 We conceive
of emotions as taking shape within us, as "inner bodily experiences. '' 7 We
might express those emotions to the social world, and the social world
might react to that expression, but these social dynamics are viewed as
separate from the feeling of the emotion itself. This conception obscures the
link between emotion and social and institutional dynamics. As Hochschild
says, "each feeling takes its shape, and in a sense becomes itself only in
social context., 75 Moral reasoning, in particular, appears to be a social,
interpersonal process rather than an individual, private one.76
When group tasks such as jury deliberation are at issue, treating each
juror like an emotional island is particularly misguided. It fails to take into
account the fundamental ways in which the emotional climate of the jury
room shapes the jury's deliberative role: the jury's ability to communicate,
the facts it finds, the ways it interprets demeanor or judges credibility, and
the normative judgments it reaches. Sociologist Candace Clark explains:
"We judge the validity and appropriateness of one another's perceptions,
interpretations, and emotional reactions ... [J]udging is a social process
Bandes ed., 1999).
72. Bandes, Victims, supra note 40 (manuscript at 15-16).
73. Id. (manuscript at 5); See also HOCHSCHILD, supra note 66, at 203 (noting that people
commonly speak of emotion as residing inside the body); Catherine Lutz & Geoffrey M. White, The
Anthropology of Emotions, 15 ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 405, 409 (1986) (noting that emotions are
generally defined as "private feelings"). I say that emotions are generally treated as internal because at
times there is a requirement, explicit or implicit, that emotions be performed publicly. See generally
Bandes, Victims, supra note 40 (manuscript at 11-15) (discussing the increased use of victim impact
statements as a public expression of grief).
74. Lutz & White, supra note 73, at 429.
75. HOCHSCHILD, supra note 66, at 212.
76. Haidt, supra note 24, at 820.
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notwithstanding the fact that it takes place internally., 77 We try to bring our
own feelings about others in line with what we think is culturally
appropriate.78 Jurors evaluate the demeanor of the defendant, the
witnesses, the attorneys, and others by consulting their own reactions and
the reactions of those around them. They evaluate the judgment of their
fellow jurors in the same way. The jury room develops an emotional
climate of its own. Regarding emotions as private and internal obscures
these complex interactions.
Misconception three: emotions are bursts of uncontrollable passion that
short-circuit rational deliberation. This misconception is twofold. First, it
equates emotion with acute or salient emotion. We tend to categorize as
emotional those states that are memorable for their intensity-times of
anger, grief, or joy that depart from our general background states. 79 Thus,
the capital system permits jury instructions about racial prejudice or fear
when it deems those emotions to be salient, but in doing so it vastly
underestimates their pervasiveness."0 Just as we are always speaking prose,
we are always feeling emotions. We are constantly deciding who we fear
and who we trust, what attracts us and what repels us, when to sympathize
and when to condemn.
Once emotion is equated with intensity, it seems to follow that
emotions are not to be trusted-that they are irrational, unpredictable
interferences with a steady state of rationality. This misconception is the
most central and tenacious of all-the one at the heart of the law's self-
conception. Although the precise relationship between emotion and
cognition is a matter of ongoing study and controversy, this conception of a
sharp separation between emotion and cognition has rapidly fallen out of
favor in every discipline that has studied the matter.8'
77. CANDACE CLARK, MISERY AND COMPANY: SYMPATHY IN EVERYDAY LIFE 196, 203,
205 (1997).
78. See id. at 203 ("Strong social norms call for us to perceive and judge other people's
behavior and to align our other-oriented feelings with the culturally appropriate judgments we make.").
79. KAGAN, supra note 9, at 5.
80. See infra notes 138-140, 159-162 and accompanying text.
81. See ANTONIO R. DAMAsIO, THE FEELING OF WHAT HAPPENS: BODY AND EMOTION IN THE
MAKING OF CONSCIOUSNESS 40, 133-67 (1999) (contending that emotions are critical to the regulation
of homeostasis and, in turn, to the biology of consciousness); FEELING AND THINKING: THE ROLE OF
AFFECT IN SOCIAL COGNITION 1-17 (Joseph P. Forgas ed., 2000) (providing a brief summary of theories
explaining the role of affect in social thinking and cognition); Richard D. Lane et al., The Study of
Emotion from the Perspective of Cognitive Neuroscience, in COGNrIvE NEUROSCIENCE OF EMOTION 3,
3-11 (Richard D. Lane & Lynn Nadel eds., 2000) (exploring the interplay between emotion and
cognition); Panksepp, supra note 10, at 8 (suggesting that primitive affective processes are the
foundation for cognitive process).
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B. A Very Brief Histoy of Emotion Theory
Understanding emotion is necessarily an interdisciplinary endeavor.82 A
range of fields, including philosophy, psychology, sociology, political science,
anthropology, and cognitive neuroscience, hold pieces of the puzzle about
what emotion is and what roles it plays. These disciplines have approached
emotion from very different angles. Even within disciplines, many issues-
including definitional issues-are hotly contested. It is questionable whether
any useful overarching definition of emotion can be formulated. As the
philosopher Amdlie Rorty succinctly says, "Emotions do not form a natural
class. 83 Another scholar states that "[t]he term emotion refers to numerous
heterogeneous processes." 84 There is a danger in regarding the term as a
description of a material, discrete, or unitary phenomenon rather than a set of
functions.85 Its definition changes depending on the disciplinary focus and the
source of evidence-for example, physical actions, biological or neurological
reactions, or verbal descriptions.86 Its description and interpretation vary
across time87 and culture. 88 Moreover, there is a concern that the very use of a
"conceptual framework that separates emotion and cognition into different
areas of research" perpetuates the false notion of antagonism between the
two.89 Jerome Kagan suggests setting aside disagreements over the correct
definition of emotion9" and instead observing and understanding the complex
phenomena we seek to study.9' The term will need to be provisionally defined
for analytic purposes, "but it should not be reified.
92
82. Arvid Kappas, The Science of Emotion as a Multidisciplinary Research Paradigm, 60
BEHAV. PROCESSES 85, 87-88 (2002). However, Robert Solomon pointed out that this division of the
study of emotions into disparate disciplines is relatively recent. He observed that in the nineteenth
century, scholars like Darwin and William James would not have understood the separation of
psychology and philosophy into separate fields. ROBERT C. SOLOMON, WHAT IS AN EMOTION? CLASSIC
AND CONTEMPORARY READINGS 55 (2d ed. 2003).
83. Am~lie Oksenberg Rorty, Introduction to EXPLAINING EMOTIONS 1, 1 (Am~lie Oksenberg
Rorty ed., 1980).
84. Arvid Kappas, What is an Emotion? Many-splendored Things!, THE EMOTION RESEARCHER
(Int'l Soc'y for Research on Emotion, Poughkeepsie, N.Y.), Fall/Winter 2006-Spring 2007, at 7.
85. Agneta Fischer, President's Column, THE EMOTION RESEARCHER (Int'l Soc'y for Research
on Emotion, Poughkeepsie, N.Y.), Fall/Winter 2006-Spring 2007, at 4.
86. KAGAN, supra note 9, at xi.
87. See, e.g., INVENTING THE PSYCHOLOGICAL: TOWARD A CULTURAL HISTORY OF
EMOTIONAL LIFE IN AMERICA 8 (Joel Pfister & Nancy Schmog eds., 1997) (exploring emotions in light
of their "historically contingent, socially specific, and politically situated" nature).
88. Lutz & White, supra note 73, at 410; Peggy A. Thoits, The Sociology of Emotions, 15 ANN.
REV. Soc. 317, 320 (1989).
89. Lane et al., supra note 81, at 5.
90. KAGAN, supra note 9, at 41.
91. See id at 3.
92. Anna Wierzbicka, What is an Emotion?, THE EMOTION RESEARCHER (Int'l Soc'y for
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With these caveats in mind, this article focuses on the way the term
emotion is used and how the concept of emotion is deployed in the legal
system. The term is often used in the legal context to communicate
opprobrium and to describe and denigrate influences that are thought to
interfere with decision-making. 93 It is a category defined chiefly in terms
of the irrational, the impetuous, and the unreasonable-that is, the
antithesis of the ideal of law. Therefore it is important to explore the
term's use and the consequences that follow. This will require a little
recent history, vastly oversimplified.
Questions about the relationship between thinking and feeling, or
reason and passion, have fascinated philosophers since ancient times.94
Plato and Aristotle debated the issue, and it was a central occupation of the
Stoics, of Descartes and Spinoza, and of Kant and Hume.95 The assumption
that emotion and reason are separate faculties goes back at least as far as the
ancient Greeks, as does the debate about whether these two faculties work
in unison or at cross purposes.96 The latter assumption, that the processes of
thinking and feeling are not only distinct but antithetical, continues to exert
a powerful influence on our understanding of reason and emotion. It has
often gone hand in hand with the conviction that, because emotions are
vague, ephemeral, and irrational, they are unscientific and not a proper
object of study.97
The nineteenth century ushered in two separate strands of emotion
theory: a scientific or organismic model (associated with Darwin, William
James, and early Freud) focusing on emotions and the brain; and a social or
interactional model (associated with Erwin Goffman and John Dewey)
focusing on emotions and society.98 Shades of that split (body vs. mind and
private vs. social) exist today. The organismic model viewed emotions as
biologically based, as instinctual rather than reflective, and as stable entities
that remain fixed across social groups, cultures, and times. 99 Proponents of
this model addressed the origins of and the triggers for emotion, but since
Research on Emotion, Poughkeepsie, N.Y.), Fall/Winter 2006-Spring 2007, at 9.
93. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Reason In All Its Splendor, 56 BROOK. L. REv. 789, 801 (1990)
("Allowing passion to play a role in the decisional process of the Supreme Court... is inconsistent with
the very norms that govern and legitimate the judicial power ... ").
94. For a fascinating history of the earliest understandings of passion and temperament, see
generally NOGA ARIKHA, PASSIONS AND TEMPERS: A HISTORY OF THE HuMouRs (2007).
95. Id. at 4-5, 39, 191-95; PAUL BLOOM, DESCARTES' BABY 125 (2004); RJ. DELAHUNTY,
SPINOZA: THE ARGUMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHERS 213-54 (1985).
96. See, e.g., Introduction to SOLOMON, supra note 82, at 1.
97. Lutz & White, supra note 73, at 409.
98. This brief description of emotion research in the nineteenth century draws heavily on Arlie
Hochschild's Appendix A in The Managed Heart. HOCHSCHILD, supra note 66, app. a, at 201-22.
99. Id. at 205.
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they viewed emotion as fixed and acultural, they were not particularly
interested in its social role.'00 The biological model's assumption that
emotion was instinctual left little room for its role in cognition.
The interactional model, conversely, focused on how social factors
mold emotion. 10' In this account, cultural context shapes emotion through
both explicit and implicit rules and expectations about what we ought to
feel and how we ought to express it.'0 2 In sociologist Arlie Hochschild's
example: if a man becomes violently angry when insulted, it will matter
what, in his cultural milieu, constitutes an insult. 10 3 Features of his cultural
milieu may aid or inhibit his expression of anger and help determine
whether he reacts to his own anger with shame or pride.' °4 In other words,
context will help determine both how he experiences and understands the
emotion and how he acts upon it. Because it assumed that societal norms
help shape emotions, the interactional model thus left more room for
discussion of emotion's role in cognitive judgment. However, it had little
to say about the science of emotions-where they come from and how
they work.
In the twentieth century, science virtually abandoned the study of
emotion, leaving scientific knowledge stalled at the conclusion that
emotions are hard-wired, instinctual, and impervious to reason. Social and
psychological theory generally accepted this duality between emotion and
reason. By the late 1960s, Lawrence Kohlberg's theory of the development
of moral reasoning was ascendant.'0 5 This theory privileged the abstract, the
categorical, and the logical. 0 6 Kohlberg's influential work defined the
terms for research on moral reasoning, which tended to view emotion and
intuition as low-order precursors to moral judgment. 0 7 In recent years this
model has been challenged in a broad array of relevant fields. Models
emphasizing the salutary role of emotion in cognition generally, and in
100. Id. at 208-11.
101. Id. at 207.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 211-12.
104. Id.
105. Lawrence Kohlberg, The Psychology of Moral Development: The Nature and Validity of
Moral Stages, in 2 ESSAYS ON MORAL DEVELOPMENT 1, 3 (1971).
106. Id.
107. See Larry Nucci, Education for Moral Development, in HANDBOOK OF MORAL
DEVELOPMENT 657, 657 (Melanie Killen & Judith G. Smetana eds., 2006) ("[M]oral development
moves from earlier stages, in which morality is intertwined with self-interest and social norms, to later,
more mature stages, in which morality as justice is differentiated from and displaces social convention
as the basis for moral judgments."); Haidt, supra note 24, at 816 (discussing highly influential nature of
Kohlberg's "rationalist" and "somewhat Platonic" model of reasoning).
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moral judgment specifically, have gained increasing acceptance.'08 This
shift has enabled a more nuanced debate about the role of specific emotions
in specific contexts.
C. A Provisional Definition
In recent years, one of the most influential and exciting challenges to
the reason-emotion duality and the mind-body duality'1 9 has come from the
field of cognitive neuroscience, which "seeks to integrate into the study of
human thought, our rapidly emerging knowledge about the structure and
functions of the brain, and about the formal properties of... decision-
making processes."" 0 The neuroscientific research, using powerful brain-
imaging tools like electroencephalography (EEG) and functional Magnetic
Resonance Imaging (fMRI) scans, has helped show the importance of both
the biological and social strands."' The current understanding of emotions
views them as biologically rooted processes, depending on innately set
brain devices, shaped by a long evolutionary history."l
2
However, as Jack Balkin usefully points out, "it is highly misleading to
think of individuals as consisting of identical hardware into which identical
copies of software are installed."'" 3 In fact, as he adds, when we speak of
the computer, we generally think of it as consisting of hardware and
108. William D. Casebeer & Patricia S. Churchland, The Neural Mechanisms of Moral
Cognition: A Multiple-Aspect Approach to Moral Judgment and Decision-Making, 18 BIOLOGY & PHIL.
169, 188 (2003); DAMASIO, supra note 22, at 38, 43; Haidt, supra note 24, at 817.
109. Neuroscientist Jaak Panksepp notes that "[b]y appreciating how the brain is organized, we
may gradually outgrow the illusory sense that we are creatures of two distinct realms, of mind and
matter." JAAK PANKSEPP, AFFECTIVE NEUROSCIENCE: THE FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN AND ANIMAL
EMOTIONS 302 (1998). He also notes, however, that "the issue of mind-brain dualism has not
disappeared completely from neuroscience thinking." Id. at 337.
110. Oliver R. Goodenough & Kristin Prehn, A Neuroscientific Approach to Normative
Judgment in Law and Justice, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC'Y LONDON SERIES B 1709, 1713
(2004) (citation omitted).
111. Casebeer, supra note 23, at 843. Cognitive neuroscience, in addition to making a
considerable contribution to the store of knowledge about emotion, serves another purpose as well. The
language and accoutrements of science-the ability to talk about "the amygdala" or "mirror neurons"
rather than fuzzy-sounding concepts like "fear" or "empathy," and the ability to show charts of brain
activity-arguably have made the study of emotion more respectable and palatable to a wider array of
scholars. See KAGAN, supra note 9, at 26 (discussing the effect of color photographs of brain states on
willingness to believe in the power of the abstract notion of "emotion"); Stephen J. Morse, Brain
Overclaim Syndrome and Criminal Responsibility: A Diagnostic Note, 3 OHIO ST. J. CIM. L. 397, 397
(2006) (arguing, with specific reference to the question of criminal responsibility, that those "inflamed
by the fascinating new discoveries in the neurosciences" are often prone to making empirically
unsustainable claims about the legal implications ofneuroscience).
112. Goodenough & Prehn, supra note 110, at 1714-15.
113. J.M. BALKIN, CULTURAL SoFTWARE: A THEORY OF IDEOLOGY 5 (1989).
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software-a meld that also describes the brain. 1 4 Current understandings
suggest that when the brain faces a complex cognitive task it recruits a
variety of brain functions as well as a diverse selection of information
sources. These sources, which include genetic information, cultural
knowledge, and personal experience, contribute to the construction of
templates or scripts about how the world is supposed to work and how
people are supposed to behave."l 5 The brain sorts and categorizes
information according to these templates.16 To use another computer
metaphor, it is not efficient to open a new file folder for each new piece of
information; the brain tries to file the information in the folder that offers
the closest fit. It filters for similarity and difference, the familiar and the
deviant, relying on shorthand indicators (some of them helpful and
accurate, some unhelpful or even pernicious).
Emotion plays a role in all these functions. As Candace Clark says,
"[j]udging is an almost constant feature of social life."'"17 More basically,
choosing is an essential feature of survival. Emotion helps to choose among
sources, emphasize, highlight, flag perceived deviance, indicate importance
and urgency, assess risk or advantage, and assist in evaluating the intentions
of others. It helps guide and prioritize decision-making processes; moving
us to action. Emotion thus plays a key role in cognition, highlighting the
importance of studying not merely the salient emotions, but also the
influence of emotional variables on the very structure of decision-making.
As Oliver Goodenough suggests:
Perhaps it is not so much that emotion is a key to normative
judgment as it is a key to important and effective normative
judgment, normative judgment that gets our attention and gets
translated into action, either with respect to our own conduct or to
the reward or punishment of others." 8
114. Id. at 4.
115. Goodenough & Prehn, supra note I 10, at 1714-15.
116. See Dan Simon, A Third View of the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal Decision
Making, 71 U. CHI. L. REv. 511, 520-21 (2004) (explaining that mental models---representations of the
factors that are included in a decision-are influenced by one's physical world, social world, and
conceptual world); Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, Categorically Biased: The Influence of Knowledge
Structures on Law and Legal Theory, 77 S. CAL. L. REv. 1103, 1131 (2004) (explaining that categories
and schemas are critical building blocks of the cognitive process); see also Dan M. Kahan & Donald
Braman, Cultural Cognition and Public Policy, 24 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 149, 150 (2006) (explaining
that cultural world-views shape normative judgments about law and public policy).
117. CLARK, supra note 77, at 196.
118. Goodenough & Prehn, supra note 110, at 1717.
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Legal judgment is not exempt from these dynamics. It is a complex
system of explicit and implicit rules and principles that must be applied by
individuals according to their varying templates. Moreover, legal judgment
occurs in a social and institutional context, within which the role of emotion
in forming legal judgment needs to be understood. Emotion is in a complex
feedback loop with institutions like the justice system. It has a role in
shaping our institutions, and the institutions in turn shape emotions-their
expression, their display, and even, arguably, their inchoate nature.
Institutional settings are rife with unspoken rules about how emotion ought
to be displayed outwardly and even about what ought to be felt internally.
III. EMOTION IN CONTEXT:
THE EMOTIONAL LANDSCAPE OF THE CAPITAL SYSTEM
The capital trial is a circumscribed, tightly controlled, and highly
ritualized setting. Judging by its formal rules, it is a proceeding that allows
little room for emotion, despite the morally and emotionally charged
question it is meant to resolve. But once the misconceptions discussed
above are identified, it becomes clear that the proceeding is rife with
emotion. It occurs against a backdrop of widely shared empathy for the
victim and his family.1 19 It poses the challenge to the decision-maker of
overcoming anger and disgust toward the defendant and exercising
empathy, at least temporarily, in order to consider the defendant's
mitigation evidence. It raises questions about the role of empathy toward
the defendant's family. The struggle over empathy is endemic to the
proceeding. Excising empathy completely is not possible or even desirable.
The better goal is to determine which emotions, and in particular which
empathetic responses, the system ought to be encouraging or discouraging
in order to improve the likelihood of a fair and just process.
This section will consider the capital jury in particular. As discussed
above, the legal system's approach to the capital jury has been to focus,
from time to time, on particular salient emotions it seeks to encourage or
discourage. The implicit assumption appears to be that in the absence of
direction about what emotions are acceptable or off-limits, jurors will
simply behave rationally-without passion, favor, or prejudice. However,
jurors are not blank slates. They cannot be separated from the templates
they bring with them. What they see will be mediated through their notions
119. But see Scott E. Sundby, The Capital Jury and Empathy: The Problem of Worthy and
Unworthy Victims, 88 CORNELL L. REv. 343, 375-76 (2003) (finding that jurors feel more empathetic




of what they expect to see, and will affect who they trust, who they
understand, who they fear, and with whom they empathize. 120 Moreover,
jury decision-making must be understood in light of the additional
templates provided by the institutional context. The trial courtroom, and
more particularly the unique institution of the capital jury, creates its own
set of cultural expectations and rules, and these include rules, usually
unspoken, about how emotion is expressed and interpreted. As Arlie
Hochschild explains in the context of corporate culture, the institution may
even help shape the emotions felt by those over whom it exerts power.
121
These rules may seem invisible, but they exact emotional costs when they
are broken.1
22
Craig Haney and his co-authors observe about the capital jury:
The courtroom becomes the jurors' separate reality, and they
spend weeks or months in this legal world, amateurs in an arena
of experts. Like all people in unfamiliar and threatening
situations, they become acutely sensitive to-and highly
dependent upon-the social cues and implicit messages they
receive from the legal experts around them.
23
In his book Death by Design, Haney persuasively argues that one of the
most salient characteristics of the capital trial is the insistent message that
the issue of life and death facing the jury is not an emotional issue.' 24 The
very appearance of dispassionate process is an important part of the
system's emotional landscape: a powerful implicit message to the jury as
well as the other legal actors. By failing to acknowledge the emotion-laden
nature of the decision in jury instructions or otherwise, with the exception
of explicit instructions to put aside passion or prejudice, the court sends
several messages. It sends a message that this decision-making process
requires merely the mechanistic application of rules; that any emotional
twinges are unwelcome intrusions and should be suppressed. 25 The
message begins early on with the death-qualifying process, in which jurors
are asked whether they are capable of following the law by voting for
120. Mike Allen, Edward Marby & Drue-Marie McKelton, Impact of Juror Attitudes About the
Death Penalty on Juror Evaluations of Guilt and Punishment: A Meta-Analysis, 22 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 715, 724 (1998).
121. HOCHSCHILD, supra note 66, at 218.
122. Id. at218-19.
123. Craig Haney, Lorelie Sontag & Sally Constanzo, Deciding to Take a Life: Capital Juries,
Sentencing Instructions, and the Jurisprudence of Death, 50 J. Soc. IssuEs 149, 151 (1994).
124. HANEY, supra note 53, at 141-43.
125. Haney et al., supra note 123, at 172.
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death.' 26 Those who say no are excluded. This process signals that death is
the default, or "expected," sentence and that those who are "good" and law-
abiding will fall in line.'
27
The message is reinforced by the jury instructions, which in various
ways provide emotional distance from the life-and-death consequences of
the verdict. Instructions may ask the jurors to find the existence of
aggravating and mitigating factors, and then fail to explain how these
should be weighed. 128 They may ask for answers to several "factual"
questions, such as whether the defendant would pose a continuing
danger. 29 Many jurors believe these instructions require them to approach
the penalty-phase deliberations as a simple accounting-a checklist of
questions and answers-in which certain answers lead automatically to a
decision in favor of a death sentence. 130 Jurors may also believe that the
judge-rather than the jurors themselves-will carry the heavy burden of
ensuring that justice is done.13'
The significance of these distancing mechanisms is underscored by
recent research in the field of cognitive neuroscience on the dynamics of
moral decision-making, which suggests that people approach ethical
decisions quite differently depending on whether they experience the ethical
issue as personal or impersonal. 132 Moral dilemmas that are experienced as
personal activate different parts of the brain, evoke a different set of
emotions, and lead to different conclusions about what is right and
wrong.133 This research helps explain in physiological terms what
psychologists like Robert Jay Lifton, Herbert Kelman, and Stanley Milgram
have long observed: it is easier to decide to hurt or kill someone when
direct responsibility is masked and that person's fate seems far removed
from your own.
134
126. HANEY, supra note 53, at 116.
127. See id.
128. Id.
129. Haney et al., supra note 123, at 164.
130. See HANEY, supra note 53, at 180 (describing how jury instructions led jurors to 'Just
[weigh] the factors" in determining the outcome). See also Robert Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 8
SUP. CT. REV. 305, 391 (1984) (describing how jurors use "legal formalities" to "distance themselves
from choices" they must make in death penalty cases).
131. See HANEY, supra note 53, at 155-56 (explaining how jurors use jury instructions to
absolve themselves from the responsibility of determining the defendant's fate). See also Joseph L.
Hoffman, Where's the Buck?-Juror Misperception of Sentencing Responsibility in Death Penalty
Cases, 70 IND. L. REv. 1137, 1147 (1995) ("[C]apital jurors are generally instructed that their verdict is
only a 'recommendation' which the judge is free to accept or reject.").
132. Joshua D. Greene et al., An fJR Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral
Judgment, 293 SCIENCE 2105,2106 (2001).
133. Id.at2107.
134. See ROBERT J. LIFTON, THE NAZI DOCTORS: MEDICAL KILLING AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
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The result of this implicit message of passionless routine is not to
banish emotion from the courtroom. Regardless of what they may say with
all sincerity in voir dire, jurors experience a gamut of emotions toward
capital defendants, including disgust, anger, and pity. 35 Studies show that
they are particularly swayed by sympathy,' 36 fear, 3 7 and conscious or
unconscious racial bias; 38 and indeed, that racial bias may determine
whether a particular defendant is the object of sympathy or fear. 39
Jurors enter the courtroom with preexisting notions about crime shaped
by media and other cultural sources. These sources tend to stoke fear-and
all too often racialized fear. They disseminate the widespread and
inaccurate impression that most crime is random, pervasive, violent, and
perpetrated by black men on white victims. 140 Yet the prevailing rules tend
to treat jurors as blank slates unsullied by cultural stereotypes, and to
decline to address issues of race and dangerousness unless they become
salient. This focus on salience is misdirected.
The perception that crime is pervasive, violent, and perpetrated by
black men on white victims contributes to racial bias in specific and general
ways. It specifically exacerbates the fear that black capital defendants, if not
sentenced to death, will pose a threat to the community. As discussed
above, this fear in turn is exacerbated by another piece of inaccurate folk
wisdom: that even a sentence of life without parole will not keep a
convicted murderer off the street for very long. 14 1 Despite evidence that
juries misunderstand the meaning of "life without parole," the common
GENOCIDE 418-500 (1986); Herbert Kelman, Violence Without Moral Restraint: Reflections on the
Dehumanization of Victims and Victimizers, 29 J. SOC. ISSUES 25, 38, 49-52 (1973); STANLEY
MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORiTY: AN EXPERIMENTAL VIEW, at xi (1974).




138. See William J. Bowers, Benjamin D. Steiner & Maria Sandys, Death Sentencing in Black
and White: An Empirical Analysis of the Role of Jurors'Race and Jury Racial Composition, 3 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 171, 180 (2001); HANEY, supra note 53, at 189.
139. See Bowers et al., supra note 138, at 244-57 (exploring how white racial bias affected the
leanings of a jury). See also Jennifer L. Eberhardt, Paul G. Davies, Valier J. Purdie-Vaughns & Sheri
Lynn Johnson, Looking Deathworthy: Perceived Stereotypicality of Black Defendants Predicts Capital-
Sentencing Outcomes, 17 PSYCHOL. Sc. 383, 383 (2006) (reporting that stereotypes, such as the belief
that black people are more criminally inclined, can affect jurors' evaluation of credibility and
blameworthiness); Thomas W. Brewer, Race and Jurors' Receptivity to Mitigation in Capital Cases:
The Effect of Jurors; Defendants' and Victims' Race in Combination, 28 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 529,
542 (2004) (finding that black jurors are more receptive to mitigation evidence in capital cases involving
a black defendant and a white victim).
140. Susan Bandes, Fear Factor: The Role of Media in Covering and Shaping the Death
Penalty, I OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 585, 595 (2004).
141. Steiner et al., supra note 58, at 472.
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judicial protocol is to refuse to address a jury's misconceptions. The
Supreme Court's holding in Simmons v. South Carolina that the defendant
has no right to demand more accurate information unless his future
dangerousness is specifically at issue1 42 is premised on the confusion about
salience discussed earlier.
143
More generally, the media portrayal of violent black men exacerbates
preexisting racial prejudice, confirming attitudes that blacks are of lesser
character. Left unaddressed, racial stereotyping will influence how jurors
respond to and deliberate with one another, how they judge witness
credibility, how they evaluate mitigation evidence, and how they assess
future dangerousness.
In social settings, there are rules about the display of emotion: when
emotions should be held in check and when an outward display is
appropriate or even expected. 44 The trial is a highly choreographed social
setting, in which the participants are quite literally judged by their
performance. Studies of jury decision-making consistently show that a
defendant's showing of remorse is correlated with a jury's willingness to
grant mercy; a defendant's lack of remorse is often cited as justification for
condemning him to death.145 Haney, in his study of California capital jurors,
reports that one of the major factors in their decision was "whether or not
the defendant expressed remorse (based only on in-court observations of
the defendant). In the opinion of most of the jurors, capital defendants
simply did not express appropriate emotion during the penalty-phase
proceedings .... , Scott Peterson's case is a recent example of this
dynamic.' 4 ' The New York Times reported that "[t]he prosecution had
portrayed his unflinching behavior [in court] as the cool calculation of a
killer.' 48 Similarly, author Beverly Lowry gives this description of Karla
Faye Tucker's attempt to follow her lawyer's instructions:
[Her lawyer] had told her to try to look dignified and calm and so
she was trying to look unmoved by the proceedings and when she
did they said she was cold and when she looked out into the
courtroom and smiled at [her father] Larry Tucker, the press
142. Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 156 (1994).
143. See supra Part L.A-B.
144. See, e.g., JONATHAN H. TURNER & JAN E. STETS, THE SOCIOLOGY OF EMOTIONS 37, 48,
232 (2005) (discussing theories about the rules governing display of emotion).
145. Haney et al., supra note 123, at 163.
146. Id.
147. Dean E. Murphy, At Peterson Sentencing, A Family's Anger, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2005, at




reported that she had smiled at somebody else, and so she never
looked out in the courtroom again. 1
49
Alex Kotlowitz describes how a jury of men and women who strongly
favored the death penalty came to spare the life of Jeremy Gross, a capital
defendant whom they had convicted of a brutal murder. 50 He recounts how
the jury, learning about Gross's own brutal childhood, gradually came to
understand him and even to empathize with various aspects of his life.' 51 At
first, jurors could not look him in the eye, and they adjudged him to be cold
and indifferent. 152 As they got to know more about him, they "began to view
what they initially thought was indifference as shame."' 5 3 This rereading of
his demeanor was crucial to their eventual decision to spare him. 54
The problem is that people are far less adept at evaluating demeanor
than they believe and than the legal system assumes them to be.'55 This
problem is greatly exacerbated when demeanor must be evaluated across
cultural, 5 6 ethnic,'57 or racial lines. 158 Bill Bowers, Marla Sandys, and Ben
Steiner found, for example, that after observing the same defendant and
interpreting the same mitigating evidence, black jurors saw a disadvantaged
upbringing, remorse, and sincerity, while white jurors saw incorrigibility, a
lack of emotion, and deceptive behavior. 159 They discovered that:
149. BEVERLY LOWRY, CROSSED OVER: A MURDER, A MEMOIR 171 (1992).
150. Alex Kotlowitz, In the Face of Death, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2003, § 6 (Magazine), at 32,




154. Id. Both the jurors and defendant were white. E-mail from Alex Kotlowitz to author (Mar.
3, 2005) (on file with author).
155. Jeremy A. Blumenthal, A Wipe of the Hands, a Lick of the Lips: The Validity of Demeanor
Evidence in Assessing Witness Credibility, 72 NEB. L. REV. 1157, 1158-59 (1993); Olin Guy Wellborn
III, Demeanor, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1075, 1104-05 (1991).
156. See Martha Grace Duncan, "So Young and So Untender": Remorseless Children and the
Expectations of the Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1469, 1499 (2002).
157. See Ronald S. Everett & Barbara C. Nienstedt, Race, Remorse, and Sentence Reduction: Is
Saying You're Sorry Enough?, 16 JUST. Q. 99, 99 (1999) (finding that both race and ethnicity affected
evaluations of expressions of remorse).
158. See generally Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Color of Truth: Race and the Assessment of
Credibility, 1 MICH. J. RACE & L. 261, 264-65 (1996) (focusing on how racial perceptions influence
credibility assessments). See also Joseph W. Rand, The Demeanor Gap: Race, Lie Detection, and the Jury,
33 CONN. L. REV. 1, 4 (2000) (presenting evidence that jurors are unable to accurately judge the demeanor
of witnesses of a different race). Jurors are also ill-equipped to judge the credibility of defendants with
mental disabilities. See Georgina Stobbs & Mark Rhys Kebbell, Jurors' Perception of Witnesses with
Intellectual Disabilities and the Influence of Expert Evidence, 16 J. APPLIED RES. INTELL. DISABILITIES
107, 112 (2003) ("[J]urors are likely to perceive witnesses with intellectual disabilities to be fundamentally
honest but are also likely to have negative attitudes towards their witnessing capabilities.").
159. Bowers et al., supra note 138, at 257-58.
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Where a white juror sees black witnesses as faking or "putting
on," a black juror sees them as sincere. Where a white female
juror interprets the black defendant's demeanor as hard and cold,
a black male juror sees him as sorry. Where a white female juror
sympathizes with the anguish of the black defendant's mother,
she blames the defendant for it and rationalizes that his execution
will be in his mother's best interest.' 60
The empathic divide between the white juror and the black defendant is deep,
pervasive, and tenacious. The Bowers study shows that a related set of
dynamics plays out in the jury room. 161 Not only do black and white jurors
evaluate the evidence differently, they also evaluate one another through the
sharply differing lenses of their own prior cultural perceptions.
162
These preexisting biases are left unaddressed except in a few narrow
circumstances in which the Supreme Court has found race to be a salient
issue. In the 1986 case of Turner v. Murray, the Court recognized that in
black defendant-white victim cases, there was a serious risk that racial
bias could lead to improper sentencing.16 3 It therefore held that a capital
defendant accused of an interracial crime is entitled to have prospective
jurors informed of the race of the victim and questioned about whether
they harbor racial bias. 164 Thus the Court acknowledges the possibility of
racial bias in a very narrow context, ignoring the vast universe of cases
and situations in which race is not salient for jurors. Several fascinating
studies suggest the possibility that racial bias is more likely to infect juror
decision-making in precisely those cases in which race is not salient. 65 In
those cases, prejudice will operate unconsciously and jurors will be less
likely to adjust their attitudes to conform to prevailing norms.' 66
160. Id.
161. See id. at 244.
162. Id.
163. Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 36 (1986).
164. Id. at 36-37.
165. Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, How Much Do We Really Know About
Race and Juries? A Review of Social Science Theory and Research, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 997, 1014
(2003) (finding that "White juror bias may be most likely when a trial is not racially charged and
jurors' concerns about racism are not made salient"); Samuel R. Sommers, On Racial Diversity and
Group Decision Making: Identifying Multiple Effects of Racial Composition on Jury Deliberations,
90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 597, 606 (2006) (showing that "the presence of Black group
members translated into fewer guilty votes before deliberations," even when such jurors are not
active participants); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Sheri Lynn Johnson, Andrew J. Wistrich & Chris Guthrie,
Does Unconscious Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REv. (forthcoming 2009)
(measuring race and gender bias and finding that once they are brought into consciousness, they can
be ameliorated).
166. Sommers & Ellsworth, supra note 165, at 1014.
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A year after the Turner decision, the Court, in McCleskey v. Kemp,
made clear its intention to avoid the deeper, omnipresent question: What are
the implications for the death penalty if the racial divide cannot be
adequately bridged? 67 This is not a question confined to the workings of
the jury.16 8 Although much attention has been paid to the dynamics of jury
decision-making, we know less about the way other legal actors, such as
prosecutors and judges, arrive at their decisions. In the conventional
wisdom, it may be understandable that a jury of laypeople will sometimes
fail to banish improper emotion from their deliberations, but this
understanding does not extend to the legal actors who are an essential part
of the capital decision-making process. 169 There is substantial research to be
done on the emotional dynamics of judging, prosecuting, and defending
capital crime.
CONCLUSION
Even if emotions roil below the surface, what is accomplished by
taking them into account? Why not preserve the aspirational fiction of a
passionless cognitive process, with the understanding that no system is
perfect? I have argued that in any real sense, rational deliberation without
emotion is simply not a viable option, and that the cherished legal fiction
that such emotionless cognition is both possible and desirable has
destructive consequences. The legal system tries to shape, harness, or
encourage emotion from time to time, and it generally does so clumsily,
without much understanding of how emotions work and how they might be
effectively regulated. Emotion is partially cognitive; it is not immutable. It
can be channeled and it can be educated. To the extent it skews judgment
we can try to discourage it or correct for it. Treating emotion as invisible is
a choice not to address dynamics that will, nevertheless, continue to operate
and will have serious consequences for the justice system.
167. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 315-17 (1987).
168. The racial disparities in sentencing contemplated by the McCleskey Court and documented
in a study by David Baldus were traced not only to jury verdicts but also to prosecutorial charging
decisions. DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY 160-62 (1990).
169. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Heuristics and Biases in the Courts: Ignorance or Adaptation?,
79 OR. L. REV. 61, 99-100 (2000) (reporting on findings that courts are more likely to recognize the
possibility of bias by juries than by judges).
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